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Abstract
This paper explores the problem of protecting a site on
the Internet against hostile external Java applets while al-
lowing trusted internal applets to run. With careful imple-
mentation, a site can be made resistant to current Java se-
curity weaknesses as well as those yet to be discovered. In
addition, we describe a new attack on certain sophisticated
firewalls that is most effectively realized as a Java applet.
1. Introduction
Java is hot stuff. The hype that has surrounded Java and
Java-enabled browsers such as Netscape mirrors the hype
associated with the Internet and the World Wide Web. It is
inevitable that this trend will not only continue, but that the
acceptance and use of Java will grow. In spite of the many
security concerns about using Java within browsers [8, 11],
the momentum that has resulted from the convenience and
functionality of downloadable executables has taken the In-
ternet by storm.
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Flaws in the design and implementation of Java-enabled
browsers have repeatedly been discovered. Some of these
exploit weaknesses in the type checking of Java, while oth-
ers exploit system-level bugs. These vulnerabilities can al-
low Java applets to erase files, leak sensitive information,
and corrupt a user's environment. At the very least, mali-
cious applets can cause great inconvenience.
Dimly aware of the dangers, most users are nonetheless
unwilling to disable Java in their browsers, and an “It won't
happen to me” attitude prevails. One contribution of this
paper is the description of an attack that allows an invading
Java applet to convince certain firewalls to open arbitrary
TCP holes to the applet's host. A variant of this attack even
allows the attacker to use a firewall's proxying software—
intended to protected the site from intruders—as a spring-
board for further attacks on the internal network. Either
way, by simply visiting a Web page or reading email in a
Java-enabled browser, users can unknowingly provide their
attacker a route through the protecting firewall.
While Java presents security concerns to users who
download applets from the Internet, it is nonetheless very
useful as a programming language. Java applets are being
developed and deployed for internal use in corporate and
other networks at a rapid pace [14]. There are many reasons
why people want to run Java within their protected network.
Java is platform independent, so multi-platform demos can
be built with relative ease. The object-oriented features of
Java and the inheritance mechanism it provides make it an
easy and convenient programming language, and the many
available class libraries make things like network program-
ming much easier than before.
A site wishing to protect itself from hostile Java applets
has few options. If users are required to disable Java in
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their Web browsers, then that site is missing out on all of
the benefits of a new and useful programming language, or
at least those features that make it convenient to run within
a browser. Also, there is little to stop a user from indepen-
dently obtaining a Java-enabled browser from the Internet
and running it. Cutting the site off from the Internet entirely
would probably not sit well with most users.
In this paper, we discuss a compromise. We describe var-
ious techniques to block Java applets at a site's firewall so
that internal applications can run Java in their browsers, but
untrusted applets from the outside cannot penetrate. These
techniques are already partially available in the public do-
main [7], and commercial firewall developers are rapidly
releasing products that offer the techniques in various com-
binations.
Section 2 contains a review of basic firewall concepts.
Section 3 describes an applet attack on certain firewalls. In
Section 4, an applet's path from server to host is described,
and Section 5 evaluates three common methods for blocking
Java applets at the firewall. Section 6 briefly describes the
authors' experimental implementation of a Java-blocking
firewall.
2. Firewall Design
A firewall is an intentional bottleneck between two net-
works designed to prohibit certain types of internetwork
communication such as login attempts and network file sys-
tem access [6, 5, 1, 3, 10, 15, 16, 20]. The firewall hard-
ware typically consists of one or more computers, routers,
or special-purpose machines. In this paper, we envision
a firewall protecting a corporate network as a single dual-
homed host, i.e., a computer with two network interfaces
able to examine traffic attempting to cross from one inter-
face to another in order to decide whether to permit the traf-
fic flow. The particulars of the firewall's network connectiv-
ity, such as screened host versus screened subnet architec-
ture [5], precise location of the decision-making host, etc.,
are not crucial to the line of reasoning we wish to pursue, so
we leave these details unspecified. We assume that one of
the firewall's two network interfaces connects to the trusted
but vulnerable local network, and the other connects to the
external and untrusted Internet. Since one of the networks
is the Internet, we restrict our attention to data in the form
of IP packets.
Computers behind the firewall are the local hosts that the
firewall protects, and computers outside the firewall are the
remote hosts, which we assume to be potential attackers.
TCP connections across the firewall that originate from the
Internet are called inbound connections, and those that orig-
inate behind the firewall are called outbound connections; in
each case, TCP permits full-duplex communications.
When designing a firewall, the essential decision to be
made is what level of granularity to use when regulating
the traffic flow. The granularity choice has a significant im-
pact on equipment costs, operating costs, throughput, and
security. Fine-grained, lightweight designs operate at the IP
packet level and are called packet filters. Coarser-grained,
heavyweight designs usually operate at the TCP/UDP level
and are called gateways or application proxies. We discuss
both approaches in the following sections.
2.1. Packet Filters
A packet filtering firewall examines each IP packet inde-
pendently, and by examining the IP source, IP destination,
and other fields, decides whether to forward the packet or
not. Ordinary packet filters make this decision by match-
ing the packet against a static set of simple rules. For in-
stance, one rule could prevent NFS packets from crossing
the firewall in either direction, and another rule could block
and log the initial packets of inbound TCP telnet port con-
nections, where “initial” means that ACK=0 in the packet's
TCP options field. The latter rule allows local hosts to telnet
to Internet hosts, but prevents Internet hosts from telnetting
into the local hosts. By blocking only the initial packets
of a TCP session, such a packet filter implicitly relies on
the local hosts to safely discard remaining packets when the
initial packet doesn't arrive. This in turn relies on the as-
sumption that all local hosts are trustworthy.
More sophisticated packet filters allow the administrator
to specify complex rules based on previous packet contents,
time elapsed, and other parameters; these are sometimes
called dynamic packet filters.
Firewalls consisting primarily of packet filters are used
at many sites. However, packet filters cannot easily enforce
policies such as “only users in group X may telnet from the
Internet to local hosts.” The problem is that a user's mem-
bership in group X is a property that has to be described
in a relatively high-level protocol. Because IP packets may
be arbitrarily fragmented and reordered and packet filters
do not retain (much) state between packets, another solu-
tion is required if the policy is to be enforced at the firewall.
Indeed, many useful protocols such as FTP, X11, and talk
are difficult although not impossible to provide in a secure
fashion using a packet filter alone.
2.2. Application Proxies
Application proxies can be thought of as man-in-the-
middle session forwarders. In this firewall scheme, a router
or simple packet filter is configured to forward all rele-
vant packets to a secured proxy host. For each protocol to
be supported across the firewall, a user-mode program lis-
tens at the appropriate TCP port1 on the proxy host. Such
1Or UDP port. For our purposes, we concentrate on the TCP case.
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programs—the individual proxies—implicitly use the proxy
host's kernel to reassemble IP packets into TCP streams.
Not only are these streams considerably easier to parse and
forward than raw IP, but unwelcome packets will rarely
make it deeper into the local network than the proxy host.
The effect is to isolate the local network from the Internet
in a very strong way.
For example, the “only group X may telnet” policy above
is easily implemented using an application proxy: the proxy
immediately presents an authentication challenge to users
attempting inbound telnet from the Internet. Once authenti-
cated, the proxy opens a telnet connection to the local host
and binds the two connections. The remote user seems to
have a direct connection to the desired equipment, but all of
the data actually flows through the proxy host. In this mode,
the proxy acts as a tunnel through the firewall.
3. A New Attack
We have discovered a new attack against certain firewalls
that is most appropriately realized as a Java applet. The suc-
cess of the attack depends on the firewall's ability to parse
and react to an FTP control session in a particular way so
that local hosts can use FTP to obtain files from the Internet.
In addition, we assume that the firewall is transparent, i.e.,
it intercepts and forwards the TCP streams opened by the
browser without the browser's knowledge or cooperation.
Both transparent packet-filtering and proxying firewalls are
at risk, at least in principle. Ironically, transparent firewalls
tend to be the most sophisticated ones.
We strongly recommend that firewall administrators re-
quest updates from their vendors. While this attack by it-
self may or may not concern firewall administrators, it is
certainly a good indication of the security risks of allow-
ing local hosts to execute a program chosen by an adver-
sary, even under the severe functionality restrictions im-
posed upon Java applets.
3.1. FTP and PORT
To explain the attack, we first review how FTP ordinarily
works [17]. A local user connects to a remote FTP server
(port 21) and is authenticated, say as the “anonymous” user.
To retrieve the file /file.txt, the user's FTP client first
chooses an arbitrary TCP port where it will wait for the
file to arrive. The client then sends a PORT command to
the server announcing this choice, and only then issues the
command to fetch the file. The server responds by actively
opening an inbound TCP connection to the specified port on
the client and transmitting the file on this connection. See
Figure 1 for a transcript of a sample session.
If the client's network is protected by a simple packet
filter, the standard FTP transfer scenario will fail when the
220 mrr96 FTP server (SunOS 4.1) ready.
USER anonymous
331 Guest login ok, send ident as password.
PASS ftp
230 Guest login ok, access restrictions apply.
PORT 172,16,1,1,19,233
200 PORT command successful.
RETR /file.txt
150 ASCII data connection for /file.txt
(172,16,1,1,5097) (107 bytes).
226 ASCII Transfer complete.
QUIT
221 Goodbye.
Figure 1. A sample FTP session. Lines be-
ginning with numbers are server responses.
The contents of /file.txt arrive on port
5097 = 19  256 + 233, not on the control port
shown here.
server attempts to open the agreed-upon port of the client.
To a packet filter, this seems like an unsolicited probe of the
client. However, a firewall susceptible to our attack con-
tains special code that watches for precisely such a PORT
command. In response, the firewall creates a window of
opportunity for the remote host to open the named port on
the client. If the remote host establishes this inbound con-
nection, it can stay open an arbitrarily long time in order to
transfer the file.
3.2. Taking Advantage
But the firewall has no way of knowing that it was a legit-
imate FTP client that generated the PORT command. Sup-
pose that a malicious insider opens an FTP connection to a
remote accomplice and announces that it intends to receive
a transmission on port 23—the telnet port. The firewall will
dutifully open a hole allowing the remote host to access the
client's telnet port. The client, in response to the inbound
telnet connection, will issue a login prompt as always, giv-
ing the accomplice an opportunity to attempt a login in spite
of the firewall. We have verified that this attack works in
some environments. Of course, it does amount to an insider
attack.
3.3. A Java Realization of the Attack
However, the attack can also be realized as a Java applet.
Java provides an almost imperceptible means to get attack-
ing code running on the client—a user need only stumble
onto the wrong Web page or read email or news in a Java-
enabled browser—and from that point, the firewall treats
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PORT 172,16,1,1,0,23
attacking
applet
Local host 172.16.1.1 Firewall for local hosts Remote Server
accomplice
telnet
daemon
Figure 2. First step. Java's Security-
Manager prevents the attacking applet from
accessing the local telnet port directly. The
applet instead sends the PORT command to
an FTP control port on the accomplice server.
The firewall permits the outbound connec-
tion.
that code as a trusted entity. That is, permitting the unre-
stricted transfer of Java applets totally automates the in-
sider's role in this attack. The user controlling the browser
need never even know that the attack took place.
When a victim obtains and invokes our applet from an
attacking machine, the applet issues an appropriate PORT
command and instructs a server running on the attacking
machine to attempt a telnet session to the victim's machine.
See Figures 2 and 3. The applet is written in perfectly legal
Java, and the server is a simple Perl script. Our applet can
bypass susceptible firewalls to penetrate any TCP port on
the client.
3.4. Discussion of the Attack
This attack has been independently discovered by other
researchers [2, 8] and was alluded to in section 5.1 of [8].
Indeed, the fundamental weakness being exploited in the
attack—FTP's use of inbound TCP connections for receiv-
ing files—has long been recognized as a special problem for
firewalls [6, 5, 3].
Before the advent of portable executable formats, every
process running inside the firewall was seen to be authen-
ticated (albeit weakly) as an insider, so permitting unre-
stricted outbound FTP didn't conflict with the security pol-
icy stating “that which is not explicitly permitted is for-
bidden.” The PORT command crossing the firewall could
be taken as proof that the insider initiated the transfer, and
so the inbound TCP connection delivering the file was as-
sumed to be associated with the permitted outbound FTP
attacking
applet
Local host 172.16.1.1 Firewall for local hosts Remote Server
accomplice
telnet
daemon
login attempt
open channel
Figure 3. Second step. Having noticed the
PORT command, the firewall gives the remote
host an opportunity to open the named port—
the telnet port (23)— supposedly for a file
transfer. The local host reacts to the open by
issuing the accomplice a telnet login prompt.
The firewall was supposed to prevent this.
session. However, now that Java-enabled Web browsers in-
vite adversaries to determine the insider's actions, such an
assumption is no longer valid. If users can run applets ob-
tained from outside the firewall, then the firewall must treat
unauthenticated insiders as adversaries. This changes the
firewall's role in the security landscape dramatically. It is
particularly interesting to note that even under the assump-
tion that the Java and firewall systems are each indepen-
dently secure, they do not compose to produce a secure sys-
tem.
3.5. Partial Solutions
Sites that require strong authentication (e.g., a challenge-
response sequence) of users attempting outbound FTP are
not susceptible to this attack, since an applet will not be able
to authenticate itself as the user. While strong authentica-
tion is often required for inbound FTP connections, some
designers reason that since inside users are already authen-
ticated, no separate authentication should be required for
outbound connections. See [1] for an example of a high-
security environment in which this reasoning was used.
(Note that this paper predates Java-enabled browsers.)
Currently susceptible firewalls can be strengthened by
modifying them to ignore PORT commands that announce
transfers to any “well-known” ports [18] (including ports
less than 1024, the so-called “privileged ports”), at the risk
of colliding with FTP sessions that innocently happen to
choose one of these ports for a file transfer. If an innocent
collision occurs, a subsequent attempt will probably suc-
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ceed; only a tiny fraction of the port space is well-known.
Of course the firewall must be also made aware of any sen-
sitive local applications listening on non-well-known ports.
Another method of decreasing vulnerability is to allow
only passive mode FTP across the packet filter [17, 3]. The
passive mode transfer scenario works almost like the stan-
dard mode, except that the server chooses a port number to
listen on, and the client actively opens that port. (TCP con-
nections are always full-duplex, so it makes little difference
which end opens the connection.) In this way, the firewall
sees the client opening an outbound connection and permits
it; no fancy PORT command interpretation is required. In
particular, our Java applet then sends its malicious PORT
command in vain, for the firewall ignores it. Unfortunately,
some FTP servers do not properly implement passive mode,
and so this is not always an option. In this case, the network
administrator could establish an FTP proxy that understands
passive mode, use a packet filter to forbid all FTP packets
across the firewall unless one of the hosts is the proxy host,
and disable any special reaction to PORT commands. The
proxy would then be able to access FTP servers that do not
understand passive mode on the clients' behalf. If the FTP
proxy is not transparent, then the FTP clients on the local
hosts will have to be modified (or the users retrained to use
the existing clients in a different way) so that communica-
tion with the proxy is possible.
3.6. Variants of the Attack
Bellovin [2] points out that the attack may even be pos-
sible without the use of Java. If a browser can be coaxed
into sending an HTTP request containing a properly format-
ted PORT command to a server's FTP port, for instance by
uploading a multipart form to http://evil.com:21/,
then the firewall will open the corresponding TCP hole.
Netscape will not honor a URL indiciating an “unnatu-
ral” low-numbered port (such as HTTP over port 21), so
Netscape cannot be used to carry out the attack. However,
this approach should work with other Web browsers.
Our attack relies on the assumption that the firewall
is “transparent”, i.e., it intercepts and forwards the TCP
streams opened by the browser without the browser's
knowledge or cooperation. At other firewalled sites, users
are instead required to explicitly configure their browsers
to use a forwarding proxy, and packet filters forbid com-
munications across the firewall except for those addressed
to or from the proxy host. The browser can therefore only
reach the outside network by connecting to the proxy. Sup-
pose that the firewall at site xxx.com is designed in this
manner and has its proxy listening on proxy.xxx.com
at port 1200. When instructed to fetch a URL of the form
http://evil.com/path, the browser instead opens a
TCP connection to proxy.xxx.com:1200 and issues
the request GET http://evil.com/path HTTP/
1.0. (The string HTTP/1.0 identifies the protocol in use.)
The proxy then forwards the request to evil.com and re-
turns the result to the browser.
If a browser uses a proxy to fetch an applet from
http://evil.com/PokeHole.class, it then in-
forms the Java SecurityManager that the applet “came
from” evil.com, even though the browser actually ob-
tained it directly from proxy.xxx.com. That is, the
browser trusts that the proxy did what it was supposed to
do. See [4] for details on proxying in HTTP/1.0.
Our attack fails when explicit proxying is used, because
the SecurityManager prevents the applet from open-
ing a TCP connection to any host other than evil.com,
but the site's packet filter prevents the browser from directly
connecting to that host. Therefore, the FTP connection for
the malicious PORT command can never be constructed.
(There is no SecurityManager equivalent restricting
TCP connections in Bellovin's suggested attack above, so
it will probably still succeed under explicit proxying.)
Another pernicious attack is possible in an explicit
proxying environment. Our assumptions are that an at-
tacker knows or can find out the HTTP proxy host
and port, say proxy.xxx.com:1200 as above, that
the victim's browser is configured to use this proxy,
and that the proxy's configuration does not prohibit in-
bound HTTP requests from the proxy itself. Sup-
pose the browser is instructed to load an applet from
the bizarre URL http://proxy.xxx.com:1200/
http://evil.com/PokeHole.class. Then:
1. The browser opens a TCP connection to its configured
proxy host proxy.xxx.com:1200 and issues the
request GET http://proxy.xxx.com:1200/
http://evil.com/PokeHole.class HTTP/
1.0.
2. The proxy, in response to the TCP open and GET
command from step 1, opens a TCP connection to
proxy.xxx.com:1200 (the host and port specified
in the GET command) and requests the resource named
http://evil.com/PokeHole.class. That is,
it writes GET http://evil.com/PokeHole.
class HTTP/1.0 onto the new TCP connection.
3. The proxy, in response to the TCP open and GET from
step 2, opens a TCP connection to evil.com and
requests the resource named PokeHole.class by
writing GET /PokeHole.class HTTP/1.0.
4. The host evil.com complies and returns the applet
class file, which then ripples back through the two
chained proxy sessions to the browser.
5. The browser, examining the original URL requested,
informs the Java SecurityManager that the applet
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“came from” the host proxy.xxx.com, and starts
the applet.
Therefore the applet actually supplied by evil.com
seems to have come from proxy.xxx.com, and so it is
(only) able to open TCP connections to the host proxy.
xxx.com. But the proxy host is designed to forward TCP
streams, so the applet can repeat the proxy self-reference
trick to access arbitrary hosts supposedly protected by the
firewall. We have verified that this attack works in some
proxying environments: our applet, delivered by evil.
com, can bounce off the proxy host to access any host
reachable from the proxy.
Although this “arbitrary” access to hosts is limited to the
protocols supported by the proxy, the proxy's implementa-
tion of these protocols may well be rich enough to support a
wide array of probes and attacks. For instance, we have seen
one proxy that implements a complete two-way tunnel be-
tween client and server when forwarding an HTTP request,
even though HTTP version 1.0 doesn't support persistent
connections. The tunnel is a nice bit of code modularity, but
results in bad security; it's enough to carry a telnet session.
We do rely on the assumption that the proxy allows
connections from itself in step 3; without it, the attack
fails. Most proxies give the firewall administrator great
freedom in determining which hosts may connect to the
proxy, so the attack can be prevented simply by making sure
that proxy.xxx.com rejects connections from proxy.
xxx.com. However, it is easy to imagine an administrator
configuring the proxy to allow access from *.xxx.com
in the absence of this knowledge, thereby enabling such an
attack. (Particularly large sites may have multiple proxies
to provide sufficient bandwidth for their users; in such a
site, the administrator would have to configure each proxy
to deny connections from any other proxy.)
This section has described in detail one attack on suscep-
tible firewalls that is most appropriately realized as a Java
applet, and has outlined two variants of the attack also ex-
ploiting the firewall-browser trust relationship. These par-
ticular flaws can be fixed, but other attacks are probably
close behind.
Ultimately, firewalls permitting applet access should
treat unauthenticated insiders as adversaries. If that is not
possible, then sites should implement a mechanism that re-
verts their security landscape to the familiar one in which
it is an acceptable risk to trust unauthenticated insiders for
certain operations. This can be done by blocking applets
from crossing the firewall so that only trusted code runs on
clients. Then our attack, other existing Java attacks, and yet-
to-be-discovered Java attacks can be prevented. In order to
block applets, we first consider the mechanism that brings
an applet to a client.
<img src=about:javalogo.gif>
Below is a destructive Java applet.
<applet
codebase="ftp://xxx.com/pub"
code=PokeHole
height=100 width=300> </applet>
Figure 4. An enabling document.
4. Delivery of Java Applets
We are concerned with Java applets that are fetched, ei-
ther intentionally or unintentionally, by Web browsers such
as Netscape versions 2.02 and 3.0. For the purposes of this
paper, “Netscape” refers to either version. Our remarks gen-
erally apply to other Java-enabled browsers as well.
In current browser environments, an applet is loaded and
invoked in two distinct stages.
4.1. Enabling Document
An applet is requested with HTML code such as that
shown in Figure 4. In order to start the applet, the enabling
document shown in Figure 4 must first be delivered to the
browser. The possible means of delivery include HTTP,
FTP, gopher, mail, news, and the client's filesystem. All
of these delivery mechanisms have URL encodings, so the
user might not know or care how the enabling document is
delivered: the user only has to do something innocuous, like
absentmindedly click on a link. Once the enabling docu-
ment arrives, the browser parses its HTML code and begins
to obtain the remaining pieces, such as the javalogo.
gif image and the PokeHole applet class file.
4.2. The Class File
At this point, the browser uses the appropriate delivery
mechanism to fetch the URL derived from the codebase
and code properties in the <applet> tag. In the above
example, the class PokeHole is fetched as ftp://xxx.
com/pub/PokeHole.class. When the binary file
PokeHole.class is delivered, execution proceeds in its
public init() method. Figure 5 shows a hex dump of the
beginning of a Java class file. Again, any document delivery
mechanism can be used to obtain a class file; however, most
untainted news and mail servers would not be capable of de-
livering the data in the correct format: every file they deliver
begins with ASCII header lines, and these would be rejected
by the AppletClassLoader. This still leaves HTTP,
FTP, gopher, and the client's filesystem as possibilities.
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00000000: cafe babe 0003 002d 0099 0800 8e08 0098 .......-........
00000010: 0800 9608 008b 0800 9408 0060 0800 5d08 ...........`..].
00000020: 0082 0700 8107 0057 0700 6f07 0085 0700 .......W..o.....
00000030: ...
Figure 5. The beginning of a Java class file.
5. Blocking Strategies
In this section we discuss the relative strengths and
weaknesses of three strategies to prevent applets from en-
tering the local network through the firewall. In each case
we assume that the attacker's goal is to get a Java applet run-
ning on the victim's host, where the applet can then exploit
existing Java bugs [8, 11] or firewall weaknesses to mount
a more serious attack. We assume that completely disabling
Java at the local hosts is not an option; perhaps the local use
of Java is required in day-to-day-business, or perhaps users
may forget to disable Java when they download this week's
spiffy new browser beta in a lower-security environment.
Besides, there is no reason to disrupt Java applets delivered
by trusted machines.
5.1. Rewriting <applet> Tags
This strategy uses a proxy that scans enabling documents
for<applet> tags and rewrites such tags in a benign form,
so that the web browser receiving the enabling document
does not actually receive <applet>, and therefore never
even attempts to fetch the attacker's applet. When rewrit-
ing the enabling document, the firewall can insert appropri-
ate HTML text explaining that an applet has been blocked.
Claunch [7] has extended Trusted Information Systems'
free firewall toolkit [12] with this strategy.
This strategy works well in many situations and does
prevent most ordinary applets from reaching a victim host.
However, in order to locate <applet> tags, the firewall
must know when to look for the tags and when not to:
it would be unacceptable to rewrite such tags if they in-
nocently occurred in a GIF image, a sound clip, or sim-
ply in non-HTML text (such as documentation) containing
<applet>. There are two parts to the “when to look”
question:
1. Detecting the <applet> tags in HTML documents,
and
2. Determining whether the stream contains an HTML
document at all.
Part 1 requires the firewall to parse the HTML file in the
same way that the browser does. This is a tricky proposi-
tion: there are already several Java-enabled browsers, and
there is no reason to think that they all produce the same
parse trees on a given document. An attacker would only
need to find a way to send <applet> in such a way that
the firewall doesn't notice it but the browser does. Given
the wide variety in browser interpretations of HTML ele-
ments, the existence of such asymmetry is not implausible.
Even worse, supporting <applet> tag blocking for multi-
ple browser types means detecting the kind of browser that
is requesting a transfer. But at least one Web browser lies
about its identity on its User-agent: line in order to re-
ceive special treatment from servers [9]!
Part 2 can be difficult as well. HTTP version 1.0
servers identify the type of their transmissions using a
Content-encoding: header line [4]. However, HTTP
0.9, FTP, and gopher servers simply deliver the file, leav-
ing the browser to decide how to interpret the transmission.
When the transfer protocol does not identify the file type,
browsers examine the extension of the requested file name
in order to determine a type. For instance, Netscape inter-
prets an HTTP 0.9 delivery of the URL http://xxx.
com/isoc.html as an HTML file, while it interprets
HTTP 0.9 delivery of http://xxx.com/isoc.gif
as an image file.2 Therefore, an attacker can fool the
<applet>-blocking strategy by coaxing a browser into in-
terpreting a file as HTML while making it look non-HTML
to the firewall.
5.2. Unwelcome Deliveries
It may be possible, through copious experimentation
and non-disclosure agreements, to determine precisely how
each browser decides when to invoke its HTML parser.
However, investigation would have to be exhaustive—
HTML parsing opportunities arise in mysterious ways.
For instance, simple experimentation shows that Netscape
with gopher proxying enabled treats the URL gopher:/
/xxx.com/n/foo as an HTML resource when n 2
f0; 5; ; ; T; 8; 2g, and in many other cases as well, even
though there is no reason to expect it: the gopher types
listed correspond to “ordinary file”, “DOS binary archive”,
“unknown”, “text-based tn3270 session”, “text-based tel-
net session”, and “CSO phone-book server”. Thus, if
2Incidentally, Netscape treats the .class filename extension as a text
specifier: one cannot start an applet by opening the URL of its .class
file directly.
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Netscape directs gopher traffic through an <applet>-
blocking proxy, the proxy had better treat almost everything
as an HTML file, even though in many cases the file isn't
HTML at all. In practice, the most likely solution using
only <applet>-blocking is to forbid gopher traffic across
the firewall. This unfortunately tends towards the degener-
ate definition of a firewall in which all traffic is forbidden; a
better solution is required.
Rewriting <applet> tags in HTML content as deliv-
ered by HTTP (0.9 and 1.0), FTP, and gopher may be pos-
sible, but mail and news are also problematic. One simple
attack is to search Usenet for postings from the targeted net-
work and identify a victim who uses a Java-enabled browser
to read mail and/or news; this information can be inferred
from article headers. Once a victim has been identified,
the attacker prepares an applet and enabling document and
sends the enabling document to the victim (or posts it to
the victim's favorite newsgroup). By encapsulating the en-
abling document with Content-type: text/html,
the attacker ensures that the browser will parse it as HTML.
When the victim reads it, the applet is fetched and invoked.
In order to secure these protocols against applets, every
mail message and every news article crossing the firewall
must be tested for HTML content, and if found, parsed for
<applet> tags. This not only puts tremendous load on
the firewall, but it suffers from the same asymmetries men-
tioned above.
These subtleties suggest that the <applet>-rewriting
strategy alone is probably insufficient but nonetheless very
useful as a first line of defense. Although we are primar-
ily concerned with Java applets, it should be emphasized
that Netscape's Javascript and Microsoft's ActiveX—the
other popular portable-executable formats—deliver the exe-
cutable in the enabling document proper. There is no second
line of defense for these formats; if they are to be blocked,
they must be blocked in the enabling document.
5.3. Blocking CAFEBABE
As seen in Figure 5 and required by the Java Virtual
Machine Specification [13], all Java class files begin with
the 4-byte hex signatureCA,FE,BA,BE. This immediately
suggests an applet-blocking strategy: prevent all inbound
files beginning with the CAFEBABE signature from cross-
ing the firewall. By proxying HTTP, FTP, and gopher, such
transfers can be detected and blocked.
Note that in recent versions of Netscape, the
CAFEBABE signature does not necessarily have to
appear at the beginning of a transmitted file. See x5.4 for
an explanation and workaround.
The CAFEBABE-blocking strategy requires inspecting
only a tiny portion of file content, so it is efficient and easy
to program. It does not require simulating any browser's
HTML parsing behavior, nor does it require guessing the
type of files crossing the firewall. Recall that mail and news
servers are usually unable to deliver proper class files be-
cause they prepend ASCII headers to their payloads. As
long as the browser user attaches to local and trusted mail
and news servers, we can safely ignore the problem of mail
and news delivery of class files; therefore, all of the poten-
tial transfer protocols for class files are covered. Finally,
this strategy is inherently good: it works by detecting a
property that Java applets are required to have, rather than
by detecting properties that are merely consistent with the
behavior of existing browsers.
Since this strategy does not consider the type of the file
in transit, there is a false-positive risk: legitimate, non-class
files could begin with CAFEBABE. We feel that this is less
likely in practice than the sequence <applet: : : occurring
in a non-HTML file, and an acceptable risk overall.
Naturally, this strategy cannot block Javascript or Ac-
tiveX code. The CAFEBABE-blocker would best be ap-
plied in combination with the <applet>-blocker; if the
<applet> tag makes it through the first line of defense,
then the CAFEBABE-blocker will catch it at the second. In
fact, detecting CAFEBABE after the <applet>-blocker
failed is an excellent sign that someone is trying very hard
to sneak in an applet, a condition conceivably worth inter-
rupting a leisurely shower [19].
5.4. Blocking by Requested Filename
Another commonly-suggested strategy is to reject all
browser requests via HTTP, FTP, and gopher for files with
names ending in .class. This strategy once enjoyed most
of the advantages of the CAFEBABE-blocker, even though
there was never any requirement in the Java Virtual Ma-
chine Specification [13] that class file names have the suffix
.class. Still, we did not find a way to convince versions
of Netscape earlier than 3.0 beta 7 to request a class file
name that is not so named.
Things have changed. Netscape versions 3.0 beta 7 and
later allow Java class files to be encapsulated in an archive
file so that multi-class applets can be obtained in one net-
work transaction. (In other words, Netscape decided not
to wait for persistent-connection HTTP standards.) The
archive format used is Zip without compression, a popu-
lar archiving format in the MS-DOS world. See Figure 6
for an example of this delivery method. In the example, the
files.zip archive contains the PokeHole class in one
of its class files. A firewall intercepting the browser request
would only see a request for the resource named files.
zip. It would probably be unwise to block all requests
for resources having the .zip suffix, since Zip files are so
widely used. FTP users in particular would find it extremely
inconvenient.
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<applet
codebase="ftp://xxx.com/pub"
archive="files.zip" code=PokeHole
height=100 width=300> </applet>
Figure 6. Using the archive form. A sin-
gle network connection fetches the files.
zip archive, which can contain multiple class
files.
One workable technique for blocking applets is to inter-
pret a request for a file beginning with the Zip file signature
(or having a name of the form *.zip) as an indication that
a Java applet might be in transit. To find out for sure, the
firewall could unpack the archive as it arrives and look for
the CAFEBABE signature. If it finds it, then it could abort
the transfer.
Netscape version 3.0 appears to require that archive files
have names with suffix .zip and that the class files em-
bedded within have names with suffix .class. However,
this is again merely an observation; Netscape is as free to
change this behavior as it was to introduce archive files in
the first place. Until then, firewall administrators and de-
signers can only hope to find out about new and dangerous
features before attackers do.
5.5. Firewall Environments
Each of the above schemes is most easily realized as an
application proxy. None of these schemes can be easily im-
plemented with a packet filter alone, since each requires
interpreting a part of the data stream that must be found
by context. For example, blocking CAFEBABE—the sim-
plest scheme—requires searching IP packets for that four-
byte signature. However, those four bytes need not arrive
in the same IP packet, and if split up, the individual pack-
ets may arrive out of order. One might wonder what kind of
well-intentioned server or gateway would fragment a packet
across its first four bytes, until realizing that in HTTP 1.
0, the signature appears after an unpredictable amount of
header information. Furthermore, legitimate HTTP traffic
doesn't always occur on the same port; a packet filter would
have to determine on-the-fly which ports on which hosts are
being used for HTTP.
In spite of this, an application proxy for Web traffic can
be added to an otherwise packet-filtering environment. In
an academic or “loose-cannon” network, where outbound
connections are almost always allowed and users are able
and apt to install new browsers, the network administrator
needs a way to force Web traffic through the proxy. One
social-engineering solution is to use the packet filter to pre-
vent outbound connections to port 80, the official [18] and
most commonly used HTTP port, thus rendering most Web
sites inaccessible. Users will soon seek assistance, at which
point the administrator can configure the appropriate prox-
ies in their browsers. This leads to an interesting situation
in which the outbound HTTP, FTP, and gopher protocols
are not prevented (except on port 80), but they are proxied
when accessed by a Web browser—the most important time
to defuse dangerous Java applets. Other programs that use
these protocols would not be impeded; a user who needed
to download a Java applet by command-line FTP would not
be prevented from doing so. Only the user poised to inad-
vertently invoke applets would be affected, which fits our
design paradigm well.
5.6. Blocking Strategy Weaknesses
1. One must consider the possibility that an enabling
document and class file might already exist in the vic-
tim's filesystem, perhaps downloaded with documentation
in HTML format. Or, if the victim's equipment can read
AFS3 files, then the attacker might be able to make the
enabling document and class file visible to the victim by
exploiting AFS's global namespace property. None of the
techniques discussed in this paper can prevent applets al-
ready available through the client's filesystem from running.
2. Any scheme that requires examining a TCP stream must
understand that stream's encoding. If any browser behind
the firewall is able to decompress or decrypt enabling doc-
uments or class files, then the firewall must unpack the file
in the same way in order to test for offending properties.
Naturally, encrypted transfers cannot be parsed by a proxy.
Instead, the user's trust in the firewall must be transferred
to trust in the remote server. Servers that have public keys
delivered with a Web browser can probably be assumed to
have higher security standards and accountability than an
anonymous cleartext HTTP server; still, a system admin-
istrator who feels that the risks of possible applet delivery
outweigh the benefits of encryption can always disable en-
crypted transfers at the proxy.
6. Implementation
We have extended Claunch's <applet>-blocker [7] to
block CAFEBABE as well. This proxy was able to block
every method we know of passing an applet through the fire-
wall for immediate execution in Netscape versions that were
then available. Our implementation does not look for Java
class files hidden in Zip archives, but it could be extended
to do so.
The base program for both blocking strategies, http-gw
(HTTP Gateway), was made available by Trusted Informa-
tion Systems in 1994 [12]. It was originally written so that
3Andrew File System, a product of Transarc Corp.
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existing client applications could use it without requiring
modification, although the user would have to use the ap-
plications differently. In a representative firewalled net-
work, an HTTP 0.9 request for the URL http://www.
ncsa.uiuc.edu/ would be unceremoniously blocked
at the firewall. However, the user could instead specify
the URL http://firewall.xxx.com/www.ncsa.
uiuc.edu/. The http-gw proxy running on firewall.xxx.
com would receive the request, use the next field in the
URL as the real host to contact, and then shuttle the data
between the two applications. If the remote host at uiuc.
edu returned an HTML file, then the firewall would also
take care to rewrite its links before presenting it to the client.
For instance, the returned page might include a link to
http://www.cern.ch/; this would have to be written
as http://firewall.xxx.com/www.cern.ch/ to
be useful to the client application. HTTP version 1.0 [4] de-
fined a way for client programs to knowingly communicate
with a proxy, making the above user adjustment and link
rewriting unnecessary; most modern browsers now support
HTTP 1.0.
Http-gw proxies HTTP 0.9, HTTP 1.0, FTP, and go-
pher, all with URL rewriting as required by relevant
protocols. It determines the transfer type by examining
Content-type: headers and filename extensions as de-
scribed in Section 5.2. Combined with the <applet>-
blocker and the CAFEBABE-blocker, it is a surprisingly
complex and subtle piece of code.
One interesting design decision involved what to do
when the CAFEBABE-blocker noticed an applet attempt-
ing to pass by. By simply aborting the transfer, the client's
Netscape would report a ClassFormatError, leaving
the user bewildered. Instead, our proxy delivers a canned
applet that opens a window (subject to the existing screen
constraints) with a message explaining that an applet was
blocked at the firewall. A little trickery is required here:
Netscape is expecting to receive, say, class PokeHole and
the proxy instead wants to deliver class CannedApplet.
The proxy proceeds by massaging the CannedApplet
bytecodes to change its name into PokeHole on-the-fly;
meanwhile, it must also modify or suppress any preceed-
ing Content-length: header lines, since the modified
CannedApplet.classwill almost certainly have a dif-
ferent size than the original PokeHole.class.
7. Conclusion
Remote execution of code has come into its own with
the proliferation of downloadable executable content, Java
being the most popular example. However, it is also evi-
dent that environments in which Java enabled browsers can
download applets from untrustworthy sites are fraught with
security concerns. Security breaches in computers that exe-
cute content from unknown sites are already great cause for
concern. This is particularly so in networks that seek to pro-
tect themselves from the rest of the Internet by firewalls be-
cause naive implementations operate on the assumption that
other local hosts are untainted, and hence more trustworthy.
The security implications of a firewall break-in are corre-
spondingly more severe. In such a situation, it becomes im-
perative to study the security implications of allowing ma-
chines to download applets from sites outside the firewall.
In our opinion, not enough attention has been paid to this as-
pect, and this work should serve as a wake-up call to those
among us who are not already anxious.
We show in this paper how some common firewalls can
be fooled into creating holes using a rather simple Java
applet. Once this hole is created, the local host which
downloads and executes this applet becomes, effectively,
bereft of the security that the firewall affords and, as pointed
out above, may be more vulnerable than hosts operating
without the assumption of a firewall. Of course, Java is
not necessary for this attack, but the fact that Java-enabled
browsers and their users are ubiquitous makes it much eas-
ier to mount. Ironically, while other security concerns re-
quire that the firewall be as clever as possible, this attack
makes some of the most sophisticated firewalls susceptible.
There is no doubt that blocking applets from crossing a fire-
wall is of essence.
Basically, in order to block applets from crossing a fire-
wall but allow other kinds of content to go through, one
has to look for <applet> tags in the downloaded stream
and delete or replace the applet code. But doing this with-
out killing legitimate traffic is not easy. Almost all the
different delivery mechanisms (HTML, FTP, gopher, mail,
news) may be used to deliver applets by encapsulating
them suitably. We found that looking for <applet>, the
0xCAFEBABE byte signature, and certain filename suffixes
are all effective strategies for detecting most of the applet
code passing through. We also point out that, because of
the fragmented nature of IP packets, detecting signatures
can be done with more facility in a proxying environment
than with a pure packet filtering mechanism. Even in a
pure packet filtering environment, some application-level
proxying should be considered. Using the strategies we
describe in such an environment, one can be more confi-
dent that a Java applet cannot pass through the firewall. The
implementation of these strategies, starting from Claunch's
<applet>-blocker, is effective if somewhat subtle.
Attacking firewalls using Java applets is only the tip of
the iceberg and the authors believe that more vulnerabil-
ities will be found in the future involving firewall secu-
rity and Java. What we have proposed can only be the
first step towards creating a secure environment for execut-
ing downloaded content using a firewall without sacrificing
the new dimensions in computing that Java avails. Prob-
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lems involving securing networks from malicious code from
the Internet abound. In particular, how to protect against
portable executable formats like Javascript that somehow
beat the <applet>-style blocking mechanism remains an
open problem.
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